Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A
Threat Scorecard
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecard
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See also Threat Assessment Criteria.
| Popularity Rank: | 664 |
| Threat Level: | 50 % (Medium) |
| Infected Computers: | 448 |
| First Seen: | July 19, 2025 |
| Last Seen: | July 20, 2026 |
| OS(es) Affected: | Windows |
Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is a heuristic detection that flags builds of the legitimate ConnectWise Control remote-support product—the tool still widely known by its former name, ScreenConnect—when they turn up in contexts that suggest abuse rather than sanctioned IT administration. The binary itself is genuine, digitally signed remote-monitoring-and-management (RMM) software, which is precisely what makes the detection important: attackers have discovered that a trusted, code-signed remote-access agent sails past defenses that would instantly quarantine conventional malware.
Because the file is a dual-use “hacktool” rather than a self-propagating virus, Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is best understood as a risk indicator. On a managed workstation it may be entirely expected; on an endpoint where no one authorized remote support, it is frequently the first visible sign that an intruder has established interactive control. This report explains what the detection means, how the underlying tool is weaponized, what our analyzed sample did in a sandbox, and how to investigate and remove it safely.
Table of Contents
What Is Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A?
ConnectWise Control (ScreenConnect) is a commercial RMM platform used by managed service providers and internal help desks to deliver unattended remote sessions, transfer files, run commands, and push follow-on software. Those same capabilities—persistent unattended access, file transfer, and arbitrary command execution—are exactly what a remote attacker wants after gaining a foothold. The “Hacktool” prefix signals that the object is legitimate technology being tracked because of its potential for misuse, not a trojan in the traditional sense.
The analyzed sample is a 4,514,696-byte (~4.3 MB) Windows executable that is authentically code-signed. The signing certificate is issued to ConnectWise, LLC and chains to the DigiCert Trusted Root G4 certificate authority, and the file carries a valid signature state. In other words, this is real ConnectWise software, not a forged imposter—which is why signature-only trust models are a poor defense here. Behavioral clustering during analysis matched the ConnectWiseControl.A family with roughly 60% similarity, consistent with a standard ScreenConnect client build.
How It Spreads / Distribution
ConnectWise Control does not spread on its own. It is deployed—either legitimately by administrators or maliciously by an operator who already has a way onto the machine. Public reporting from CISA and multiple vendors documents a sharp, sustained rise in adversarial use of RMM tools as an initial-access and persistence mechanism. The dominant delivery pattern is social engineering: spear-phishing emails and fake “IT alert” or “refund/support” lures that trick a user into launching a pre-configured client or clicking an invite link that stitches the endpoint straight into an attacker-controlled relay.
Since 2025, researchers have also documented trojanized and stripped-down ScreenConnect installers—including ClickOnce-style runners—used to convert a trusted remote-admin tool into a stealthy foothold that then drops additional remote-access trojans for redundancy. ConnectWise Control is frequently observed alongside other RMM utilities and commodity RATs, a deliberate “belt-and-suspenders” tactic so that removing one channel does not evict the intruder. Ransomware affiliates, initial-access brokers, and APT crews have all been tied to this technique, which maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1219: Remote Access Tools.
Technical Analysis & Behavior
Sandbox execution of the representative sample produced a behavior profile that blends normal installer activity with traits an analyst should scrutinize. AMAS grouped its runtime actions into five categories: user_data_access, anti_debug, encryption_used, process_manipulation_evasion, and a general other_suspicious bucket. That combination is coherent for a remote-support agent: it enumerates and reads user/session data to broker a remote view, it protects its own session traffic with cryptography, and it manages child processes to launch the control client.
Static traits reinforce the picture. The file is a managed .NET x86 image that carries an Installer Version resource and references the RijndaelManaged AES implementation, the ntdll native layer, and bundled dll components. It also exhibits HighEntropy sections—expected for a packaged, compressed installer and for its encrypted configuration—yet no discrete third-party packer was identified. The PE header shows nine notable characteristic flags. The concern is not that these behaviors are inherently malicious; it is that a valid ConnectWise agent bundling AES routines, anti-analysis checks, and process control gives an operator a full interactive foothold under a trusted signature.
Indicators of Compromise
The following indicators come from a single analyzed sample. Treat them as representative, not exhaustive: ConnectWise Control is redistributed in countless per-instance builds, so hashes and configuration values rotate between deployments, and the presence of a legitimately signed agent is itself the primary indicator rather than any one file hash.
- SHA-256: 63928352386C7BDBA4B9864DF23CCD24E7487FACB5C35E316639D70E566480CA
- SHA-1: 444010218c7b6b741ac9b62e2f9a09b8405aeb78
- MD5: 14de216fc9198bb49a3cc91225d2f86c
- File size: 4,514,696 bytes (~4.3 MB)
- Digital signature: signed by ConnectWise, LLC, chaining to DigiCert Trusted Root G4 (valid signature)
- Type/traits: .NET x86 installer, HighEntropy sections, RijndaelManaged (AES) references, no third-party packer
During detonation the sample recorded 9 registry modifications and 1 file-system write—counts consistent with a client that registers itself and stages its session configuration rather than sprawling across the disk.
Detection Heuristics
Because the binary is validly signed, engines cannot rely on signature reputation alone. Detection of Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is driven by policy and behavior: identifying the ConnectWise Control client family by its .NET installer structure, embedded configuration, and product metadata, then correlating that with context—was this agent expected on this asset? Heuristic weighting also considers the runtime cluster observed here (anti-debug checks, AES/RijndaelManaged usage, process manipulation, and broad user-data access) and the high-entropy managed image. Family clustering that matched ConnectWiseControl.A at ~60% similarity is the kind of fuzzy fingerprint AMAS uses to group builds despite per-instance differences. The takeaway for defenders: allow-list authorized RMM tooling and alert on any RMM agent outside that list.
Digital Forensics
Investigators should hunt for the artifacts a ScreenConnect client leaves behind. On disk, look for a ConnectWise Control / ScreenConnect client executable or service binary (the sample weighs ~4.3 MB and is signed by ConnectWise, LLC). In the registry, the sample generated 9 modifications—review keys tied to service registration and application configuration, and correlate their timestamps against your change window. Enumerate installed services and scheduled tasks for a ConnectWise/ScreenConnect entry configured for unattended start, since RMM installers commonly create a Windows service for persistence. In running memory and process trees, look for the .NET client spawning child processes (matching the observed process-manipulation behavior) and for outbound sessions to a remote relay. Session and event logs—who connected, when, and what commands or file transfers occurred—are often the most decisive evidence of misuse. The single observed file write and modest registry footprint mean the strongest signal is frequently the mere existence of an unsanctioned, otherwise-legitimate remote-access agent.
Symptoms of Infection
Abuse of ConnectWise Control is designed to be quiet, but tell-tale signs include: an unexpected “ConnectWise Control” or “ScreenConnect” entry in installed programs, services, or the system tray; the cursor moving or windows opening with no one at the keyboard; a remote-support session banner or connection notice you did not initiate; a ConnectWise-signed service starting automatically at boot; unexplained outbound network connections; and secondary tools or scripts appearing shortly after the agent—consistent with an operator staging follow-on payloads. On a machine that was never enrolled with a managed service provider, any of these should be treated as a potential compromise.
How to Remove Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A
1. Run a full malware scan. Use SpyHunter to perform a complete system scan. Because attackers routinely pair ConnectWise Control with additional RATs and droppers, let the scanner enumerate the whole disk so it can surface any companion payloads, not just the RMM agent itself, then quarantine everything it flags.
2. Disconnect and preserve evidence. If the agent is unauthorized, isolate the machine from the network to cut the operator's live session before you begin removal, and—if this is a business asset—capture logs first for incident response.
3. Uninstall the agent and stop its service. Boot into Safe Mode with Networking, open Services and stop any ConnectWise Control / ScreenConnect service, then remove the program via Settings > Apps > Installed apps. Delete leftover client files and remove the associated service/scheduled-task and configuration registry entries created during install.
4. Clean affected browsers. Remote-access lures often ride in through the browser, so clear residual redirects and permissions:
- Chrome: Settings > Reset settings > Restore settings to their original defaults; review Site Settings > Notifications and remove unknown allowances; remove unrecognized extensions.
- Firefox: Help > More troubleshooting information > Refresh Firefox; review Settings > Privacy & Security > Permissions; remove unknown add-ons.
- Edge: Settings > Reset settings > Restore settings to their default values; check Cookies and site permissions > Notifications; remove suspicious extensions.
- Android: Uninstall any unknown remote-support or “screen share” app, revoke Accessibility and Device-admin permissions granted to it, and clear the default browser's site data; if problems persist, boot into Safe Mode to remove stubborn apps.
5. Rotate credentials and verify. Assume anything typed or stored during the unauthorized session was exposed—change passwords (from a clean device), enable multi-factor authentication, and re-scan to confirm the endpoint is clean. Manual removal is viable for the agent alone, but any host that hosted an intruder session should be rebuilt when its integrity cannot be assured.
Conclusion
Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is not a broken or forged file—it is legitimate, ConnectWise-signed ScreenConnect software flagged because that legitimacy is exactly what adversaries exploit. Judge it by context: an authorized help-desk tool on a managed device is normal, while the same agent on an unenrolled endpoint is a strong indicator of remote compromise and a likely precursor to additional payloads. Investigate how it arrived, hunt for companion tooling, remove it with a full scan and careful manual cleanup, and rotate credentials for any host where an unauthorized remote session may have occurred.
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | Root Not Trusted |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
14de216fc9198bb49a3cc91225d2f86c
SHA1:
444010218c7b6b741ac9b62e2f9a09b8405aeb78
SHA256:
63928352386C7BDBA4B9864DF23CCD24E7487FACB5C35E316639D70E566480CA
File Size:
4.51 MB, 4514696 bytes
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MD5:
85838f1201603cccf122bf0f0ba27297
SHA1:
18f21c71aae6d3347f3a33a106aa686174703c0d
SHA256:
D3765565689817C82DC9E613008F353B00946AA454B09DCE03580E286FACFF78
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
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MD5:
ca4ebafbdd125311a0441f3263969825
SHA1:
351390dd44dff517cd25d91c8fca90dab217ecbb
SHA256:
02B6A0CA66F4410CFEFDA7C7C87C279CE69F45FBF14A3A7253A12F4C930193B0
File Size:
3.79 MB, 3787320 bytes
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MD5:
13acdce6ec0843bc8cefdbf007b10870
SHA1:
09d6d130004a2701b5f043a51ba7a127b2a9a27d
SHA256:
1682B94E521E0B14C6EB2D363A1E1C130DBD199CFA1ED3DB1171F70D273079FE
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2508344 bytes
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Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have exports table
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
- File is not packed
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Company Name | ScreenConnect Software |
| File Description | ScreenConnect Client |
| File Version | 26.3.11.9650 |
| Internal Name | ScreenConnect.Client.exe |
| Original Filename | ScreenConnect.Client.exe |
| Product Name | ScreenConnect |
| Product Version | 26.3.11.9650 |
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ConnectWise, LLC | DigiCert Trusted Root G4 | Root Not Trusted |
File Traits
- .NET
- dll
- HighEntropy
- Installer Version
- No Version Info
- ntdll
- RijndaelManaged
- x86
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 1,606 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 29 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 1,577 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 0 |
Visual Map
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Similar Families
Similar Families
This section lists other families that share similarities with this family, based on EnigmaSoft’s analysis. Many malware families are created from the same malware toolkits and use the same packing and encryption techniques but uniquely extend functionality. Similar families may also share source code, attributes, icons, subcomponents, compromised and/or invalid digital signatures, and network characteristics. Researchers leverage these similarities to rapidly and effectively triage file samples and extend malware detection rules.- ConnectWiseControl.A
Files Modified
Files Modified
This section lists files that were created, modified, moved and/or deleted by samples in this family. File system activity can provide valuable insight into how malware functions on the operating system.| File | Attributes |
|---|---|
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::proxybypass | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::intranetname | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::uncasintranet | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::autodetect | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::proxybypass | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::intranetname | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::uncasintranet | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::autodetect | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\eventlog\application\screenconnect::eventmessagefile | C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\EventLogMessages.dll | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| User Data Access |
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| Anti Debug |
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| Encryption Used |
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| Other Suspicious |
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| Process Manipulation Evasion |
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