Filecoder.D Ransomware
Threat Scorecard
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecard
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards are assessment reports for different malware threats which have been collected and analyzed by our research team. EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards evaluate and rank threats using several metrics including real-world and potential risk factors, trends, frequency, prevalence, and persistence. EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards are updated regularly based on our research data and metrics and are useful for a wide range of computer users, from end users seeking solutions to remove malware from their systems to security experts analyzing threats.
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards display a variety of useful information, including:
Popularity Rank: The ranking of a particular threat in EnigmaSoft’s Threat Database.
Severity Level: The determined severity level of an object, represented numerically, based on our risk modeling process and research, as explained in our Threat Assessment Criteria.
Infected Computers: The number of confirmed and suspected cases of a particular threat detected on infected computers as reported by SpyHunter.
See also Threat Assessment Criteria.
| Threat Level: | 100 % (High) |
| Infected Computers: | 84 |
| First Seen: | January 24, 2013 |
| Last Seen: | October 19, 2026 |
| OS(es) Affected: | Windows |
Filecoder.D Ransomware is a dangerous file-encrypting threat that targets Windows computers with the goal of locking victims out of their own documents, photos, and other personal files until a ransom is paid. Classified with the highest possible danger rating, this malware has been observed in the wild for an extended period, with detections spanning from early 2013 through recent activity, showing it remains an active threat that security researchers continue to track.
Table of Contents
What Filecoder.D Ransomware Does
Once active on a system, Filecoder.D scans local drives for valuable file types—such as documents, images, PDFs, and Microsoft Office files—and encrypts them using strong cryptographic routines, rendering the data unreadable without a special decryption key held by the attackers. The malware leverages Windows encryption libraries to perform this process, making manual recovery of files extremely difficult or impossible without a backup.
A particularly destructive behavior associated with this threat is its attempt to delete Volume Shadow Copies, the built-in Windows feature that allows users to restore previous versions of files. By running commands to delete shadow copies and disabling related system services, the ransomware ensures that victims cannot easily use native Windows tools to recover encrypted data, increasing pressure to pay the demanded ransom. It may also attempt to interact with system services and processes to disable security tools or ensure it can run with elevated privileges, and it has been seen using scripting components such as PowerShell during its execution, a tactic common among modern ransomware families to blend in with legitimate system activity.
How It Spreads
Like most ransomware, Filecoder.D typically relies on deceptive distribution methods rather than a single fixed delivery channel. Common infection vectors for this category of threat include malicious email attachments disguised as invoices or documents, infected links in spam messages, exploit kits that take advantage of unpatched software vulnerabilities, bundled downloads from untrustworthy websites, and pirated software or cracked applications. Users may unknowingly trigger the infection by opening a malicious file or enabling macros in a compromised document.
Risks for Users
The consequences of a Filecoder.D infection can be severe. Victims may permanently lose access to irreplaceable files, including family photos, financial records, and work documents, especially if no backup exists. Beyond data loss, paying the ransom offers no guarantee that attackers will provide a working decryption key, and doing so only funds further criminal activity. Infected systems may also suffer from degraded performance, disabled security features, and further exposure to additional malware.
Signs of Infection
Users should watch for files that suddenly become inaccessible or display unusual extensions, ransom notes appearing on the desktop or within folders, a noticeable slowdown in system performance, unexpected pop-ups demanding payment, and missing shadow copies or backup restoration points. Unusual activity involving system services or scripting tools running without explanation can also be a warning sign.
How to Stay Protected
To reduce the risk of ransomware infections, users should regularly back up important files to an external or offline location, keep the operating system and all software updated with the latest security patches, avoid opening attachments or links from unknown or suspicious emails, and refrain from downloading pirated software. Running reputable security software, enabling firewall protection, and exercising caution with macros in office documents are also essential steps. Maintaining current backups remains the most reliable way to recover from a ransomware attack without paying a ransom.
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | Filecoder.D Ransomware |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | No Signature |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
b10a7ece58207d3caecff1e7a3c33647
SHA1:
0568f740a0fcfc1506700f54136d341a351c51a5
SHA256:
9B1B6DC7878A1A9E2BDF659CA21DC62B16618B4C228B1E571757DF8772A2047F
File Size:
678.91 KB, 678912 bytes
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Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have exports table
- File doesn't have resources
- File doesn't have security information
- File has TLS information
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
- File is not packed
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- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
File Traits
- HighEntropy
- No Version Info
- x86
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 2,658 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 109 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 2,549 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 0 |
Visual Map
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Files Modified
Files Modified
This section lists files that were created, modified, moved and/or deleted by samples in this family. File system activity can provide valuable insight into how malware functions on the operating system.| File | Attributes |
|---|---|
| \device\namedpipe\dav rpc service | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| \device\namedpipe\pshost.134367906788192588.6460.defaultappdomain.powershell | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data,LEFT 524288 |
| \device\namedpipe\wkssvc | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\__psscriptpolicytest_qeb0kbvh.thf.ps1 | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\__psscriptpolicytest_umqkfmxb.r1n.psm1 | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKLM\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\system::enablelinkedconnections | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run::msfeeditor | "c:\users\user\downloads\0568f740a0fcfc1506700f54136d341a351c51a5_0000678912" e | RegNtPreCreateKey |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | 몯㢼廦ǝ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | 榃㤋廦ǝ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | ᗑ㥚廦ǝ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| Service Control |
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| Process Shell Execute |
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| Process Manipulation Evasion |
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| Syscall Use |
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| Anti Debug |
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| User Data Access |
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| Process Terminate |
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| Encryption Used |
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| Other Suspicious |
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Shell Command Execution
Shell Command Execution
This section lists Windows shell commands that are run by the samples in this family. Windows Shell commands are often leveraged by malware for nefarious purposes and can be used to elevate security privileges, download and launch other malware, exploit vulnerabilities, collect and exfiltrate data, and hide malicious activity.
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
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net stop VSS & sc config VSS start= disabled
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sc config VSS start= Demand & net start VSS
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WriteConsole: DESCRIPTION:
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wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY delete /nointeractive
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vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=unbounded
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=401MB
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=unbounded
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=401MB
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=unbounded
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=401MB
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=unbounded
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=401MB
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=unbounded
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=401MB
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vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=unbounded
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bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No
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bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
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wbadmin.exe DELETE CATALOG -quiet
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icacls.exe "{A-Z}:" /grant {Username}:F /T /C /Q
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WriteConsole: {Username}
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WriteConsole: :
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WriteConsole: No mapping betwe
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WriteConsole: Successfully pro
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del /s /f /q c:\*.VHD c:\*.bac c:\*.bak c:\*.wbcat c:\*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\backup*.* c:\*.set c:\*.win c:\*.dsk
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del /s /f /q d:\*.VHD d:\*.bac d:\*.bak d:\*.wbcat d:\*.bkf d:\Backup*.* d:\backup*.* d:\*.set d:\*.win d:\*.dsk
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del /s /f /q e:\*.VHD e:\*.bac e:\*.bak e:\*.wbcat e:\*.bkf e:\Backup*.* e:\backup*.* e:\*.set e:\*.win e:\*.dsk
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del /s /f /q f:\*.VHD f:\*.bac f:\*.bak f:\*.wbcat f:\*.bkf f:\Backup*.* f:\backup*.* f:\*.set f:\*.win f:\*.dsk
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del /s /f /q g:\*.VHD g:\*.bac g:\*.bak g:\*.wbcat g:\*.bkf g:\Backup*.* g:\backup*.* g:\*.set g:\*.win g:\*.dsk
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del /s /f /q h:\*.VHD h:\*.bac h:\*.bak h:\*.wbcat h:\*.bkf h:\Backup*.* h:\backup*.* h:\*.set h:\*.win h:\*.dsk
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del %0
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wbadmin.exe DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP
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wbadmin.exe DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -deleteoldest
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powershell -command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete()
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